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Scientific Evidence in Criminal 
Prosecutions 
A RETROSPECTIVE 
Paul C. Giannelli† 
The publication of the National Academy of Sciences 
(NAS) Report on forensic science, Strengthening Forensic 
Science in the United States: A Path Forward,1 in February 
2009 marked the culmination of thirty years of debate on the 
admissibility of scientific evidence. In a sense, the NAS Report 
told Congress to scrap the current structure and replace it with 
a system that was independent of law enforcement and 
premised on the research norms of science.2 The impetus for the 
report can be traced to two events: The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,3 an 
opinion that revolutionized the legal test for the admissibility 
of expert testimony, and DNA analysis, a technique that 
  
 † Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, 
Case Western Reserve University. Like most evidence teachers, I am deeply indebted 
to Margaret Berger. I began teaching evidence in 1975, the year the Federal Rules of 
Evidence became effective. In preparing for class, I relied on JACK B. WEINSTEIN & 
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE, which was the only complete text on 
the Federal Rules at the time. In class, I used JACK B. WEINSTEIN, JOHN MANSFIELD, 
MARGARET A. BERGER & NORMAN ABRAMS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE, as my 
casebook. See Paul C. Giannelli, Book Review: Cases and Materials on Evidence, 49 
BROOK. L. REV. 629, 633-34 (1983) (“In summary, the seventh edition improves what 
was already an exceptional book. The comprehensiveness of the text, achieved in part 
through the use of copious notes, has been retained, and the organizational changes 
will assist in the effective presentation of the course material.”). 
 1 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009). The National Research Council is an arm of the 
National Academies. 
 2 See infra text accompanying notes 79-90. 
 3 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Court followed with General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 
522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), to make 
up what is now known as the Daubert trilogy; see also United States v. Alatorre, 222 
F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Daubert has become ubiquitous in federal trial 
courts.”); United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 815 (4th Cir. 2000) (“In Daubert, the 
Supreme Court radically changed the standard for admissibility of scientific 
testimony.”); David L. Faigman, Is Science Different for Lawyers?, 297 SCIENCE 339, 
340 (2002) (“Daubert initiated a scientific revolution in the law.”). 
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revolutionized forensic science. Professor Margaret Berger 
played a significant role in both these developments, as well as 
in the NAS Report itself. 
I. THE DAUBERT TRILOGY 
The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective in 1975. 
At that time, the leading case on the admissibility of scientific 
evidence was Frye v. United States,4 which held that the 
admissibility of expert testimony depended on its “general 
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”5 In 1974, 
the D.C. Circuit observed that Frye had “been followed 
uniformly in this and other Circuits and there has never been 
any successful challenge to it in any federal court.”6 Frye was 
also the majority rule in the states.7 Yet, neither Frye nor the 
admissibility of novel scientific evidence was addressed in the 
legislative history of the Federal Rules. The issue was ignored 
in the advisory committee’s notes,8 the congressional committee 
reports,9 and the extensive hearings on the Federal Rules.10 The 
year before the Supreme Court decided Daubert, Judge Becker 
and Professor Orenstein referred to the Frye issue as the “most 
controversial and important unresolved question in the Federal 
Rules” of Evidence.11 
  
 4 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See generally James E. Starrs, “A Still Life 
Watercolor”: Frye v. United States, 27 J. FORENSIC SCI. 684 (1982).  
 5 Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
 6 United States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also 
United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975) (The “federal courts 
of appeals continue to subscribe to [the] ‘general scientific acceptability’ criterion.”). 
 7 See Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1978) (“This criterion of ‘general 
acceptance’ in the scientific community has come to be the standard in almost all of the 
courts in the country which have considered the question of the admissibility of 
scientific evidence.”). 
 8 Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 
(1973). 
 9 H.R. REP. NO. 93-650 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075; S. REP. 
NO. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051; H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597 (1974) 
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098. 
 10 Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on 
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 
(1973); Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d 
Cong. (1974).  
 11 Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After 
Sixteen Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, The Need for an Advisory 
Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 863 (1992). 
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During this pre-Daubert era, textwriters12 and law 
review commentators13 disagreed sharply about the continued 
viability of the Frye test under the Federal Rules. Moreover, if 
Frye was discarded, what would replace it? Arguing that the 
Federal Rules’ failure to incorporate Frye indicated its 
abandonment, Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger proposed 
an alternative approach specifying a number of factors for 
determining the reliability of expert testimony: (1) the new 
technique’s general acceptance in the field, (2) the expert’s 
qualifications and stature, (3) the use that has been made of 
the technique, (4) the potential rate of error, (5) the existence of 
specialized literature, (6) the novelty of the new invention, and 
(7) the extent to which the technique relies on the subjective 
interpretation of the expert.14 At a conference devoted to this 
issue, Professor Berger argued for this enhanced reliability 
test,15 commenting that the “Frye test often seems to obscure 
what the lawyers really should be asking. The question is not 
always whether a procedure is scientifically valid, but whether 
the procedure is being applied appropriately under the 
circumstances in a particular case.”16 At another point, she 
reported for a breakout group:  
  
 12 Compare MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 703.2, 
at 655 (3d ed. 1991) (supporting Frye or a “substantial acceptance” test) and 1 DAVID 
W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 105, at 818 (1977) 
(“Probably the ‘general scientific acceptance’ approach has survived the enactment of 
the Federal Rules . . . .”), with 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE 
MANUAL ¶ 702[03] (1993) (Federal Rules’ failure to incorporate Frye indicates its 
abandonment) and 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5169, at 92 (1978) (“Rule 401 repeals the Frye standard.”).  
 13 See Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 595, 632 (1988) (criticizing Frye); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel 
Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 
1197, 1207-08 (1980) (same); Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New 
Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 895-904 (1982) (discussing federal and 
state courts that limited or rejected Frye). 
 14 3 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 12, at ¶ 702[03].  
 15 The National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists sponsored a conference 
on the Frye test in the early 1980s. Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 
99 F.R.D. 187 (1983). Subsequently, the ABA Section of Science and Technology 
organized a symposium on the topic, including proposed amendments to Rule 702. See 
Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 26 
JURIMETRICS J. 245 (1986); Paul C. Giannelli, Scientific Evidence: A Proposed 
Amendment to Federal Rule 702, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 260 (1986); Frederic I. Lederer, 
Resolving the Frye Dilemma—A Reliability Approach, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 240 (1986); 
James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to 
Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 249 (1986);. Commentaries on 
the various proposals were later discussed at the ABA’s annual conference in August 
1986. Rules for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79 (1987). 
 16 99 F.R.D. at 222.  
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No one in our group thought that the general acceptance test should 
be retained, because no one could state specifically just what it 
means. On the other hand, we do not think that all scientific 
evidence should be admitted under a loosely structured relevance 
standard. We agreed that the court should conduct some sort of 
preliminary screening to ensure that a threshold of validity has been 
met.17 
The Supreme Court’s approach in Daubert echoed 
Professor Berger’s position in several respects. First, the Court 
jettisoned Frye as a matter of statutory interpretation. Second, 
the Court required an independent judicial assessment of the 
reliability of expert testimony. Third, the Court’s reliability test 
rested on a multi-factor analysis, albeit with some factors that 
differed from the Weinstein-Berger proposal.18 In the aftermath 
of Daubert, many evidence scholars attempted to predict the 
ramifications of the decision.19 Few were as perceptive as 
Professor Berger, who wrote on the topic the year after Daubert 
was decided.20 She made three observations about expert 
testimony in criminal cases. 
A. Lack of Empirical Research 
Her first point stressed the lack of empirical research: 
“Considerable forensic evidence made its way into the 
courtroom without empirical validation of the underlying 
theory and/or its particular application. Courts never required 
some of the most venerable branches of forensic science—such 
as fingerprinting, ballistics, and handwriting—to demonstrate 
their ability to make unique identifications.”21 A year later, 
challenges to the admissibility of these forensic techniques 
began. The first significant challenge under Daubert involved 
handwriting and came in United States v. Starzecpyzel,22 
  
 17 Id. at 230. 
 18 In describing the trial judge’s screening or “gatekeeping function,” the 
Court identified a number of factors: (1) testability, (2) peer review and publication, (3) 
error rate, (4) maintenance of standards, and (5) general acceptance. Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). 
 19 See generally Symposium, Scientific Evidence After the Death of Frye, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1745 (1994). 
 20 Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 
78 MINN. L. REV. 1345 (1994) [hereinafter Procedural Paradigms]. 
 21 Id. at 1354. 
 22 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). See generally 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & 
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ch. 21 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing the 
scientific and legal issues associated with questioned document examinations).  
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decided in 1995.23 Other handwriting cases followed, pointing 
out the lack of empirical support underpinning the technique.24 
Significantly, these cases viewed the Daubert trilogy as inviting 
“reexamination even of ‘generally accepted’ venerable, technical 
fields.”25 
If Starzecpyzel unnerved document examiners, United 
States v. Llera Plaza26 “sent shock waves through the 
community of fingerprint analysts.”27 In that case, Judge Pollak 
ruled that fingerprint experts would not be permitted to testify 
that two sets of prints “matched”—that is, a positive 
identification to the exclusion of all other persons. This was the 
first time in nearly a hundred years that such a decision had 
been rendered.28 On rehearing, however, Judge Pollak reversed 
  
 23 Handwriting was a prime target because a comprehensive article 
questioning the underpinnings of the technique had been published in 1989. According 
to the authors of that article:  
Our literature search for empirical evaluation of handwriting identification 
turned up one primitive and flawed validity study from nearly 50 years ago, 
one 1973 paper that raises the issue of consistency among examiners but 
presents only uncontrolled impressionistic and anecdotal information not 
qualifying as data in any rigorous sense, and a summary of one study in a 
1978 government report. Beyond this, nothing. 
D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy For Rational Knowledge: 
The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise”, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 738 
(1989).  
 24 See, e.g., United States v. Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967 (D. Ariz. 2002) 
(“Because the principle of uniqueness is without empirical support, we conclude that a 
document examiner will not be permitted to testify that the maker of a known 
document is the maker of the questioned document. Nor will a document examiner be 
able to testify as to identity in terms of probabilities.”); United States v. Lewis, 220 F. 
Supp. 2d 548, 554 (S.D. W. Va. 2002) (Expert’s “bald assertion that the ‘basic principle 
of handwriting identification has been proven time and time again through research in 
[his] field,’ without more specific substance, is inadequate to demonstrate testability 
and error rate.”). 
 25 United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999) (handwriting 
comparison); see also Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 966 (same) (“Courts are now 
confronting challenges to testimony, as here, whose admissibility had long been 
settled.”).  
 26 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated, mot. granted on recons., 188 
F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002). See generally 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra 
note 22, at ch. 16 (discussing the scientific and legal issues associated with fingerprint 
identification).  
 27 D.H. Kaye, The Nonscience of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera-Plaza, 
21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1073, 1073 (2003). 
 28 The first reported fingerprint case was decided in 1911. See People v. 
Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077 (Ill. 1911). As Professor Mnookin has noted, however, 
“fingerprints were accepted as an evidentiary tool without a great deal of scrutiny or 
skepticism.” Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 
BROOK. L. REV. 13, 17 (2001). She elaborated: “Even if no two people had identical sets 
of fingerprints, this did not establish that no two people could have a single identical 
print, much less an identical part of a print. These are necessarily matters of 
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himself,29 and later cases would continue to uphold the 
admissibility of fingerprint evidence.30 Yet, the case had 
captured the attention of the media, with news reports,31 
mainstream publications,32 scientific journals,33 and television 
shows giving it substantial coverage.34 Legal articles followed,35 
  
probability, but neither the court in Jennings nor subsequent judges ever required that 
fingerprint identification be placed on a secure statistical foundation.” Id. at 19. 
 29 188 F. Supp. 2d at 261. Llera Plaza II was not a total victory for the 
prosecution. The rigor of proficiency testing was drawn into question because a 
fingerprint examiner from New Scotland Yard testified that the FBI tests were 
deficient: “It’s not testing their ability. It doesn’t test their expertise. I mean I’ve set 
these tests to trainees and advanced technicians. And if I gave my experts these tests, 
they’d fall about laughing.” Id. at 558. The district court agreed, noting that “the FBI 
examiners got very high proficiency grades, but the tests they took did not. . . . [O]n the 
present record I conclude that the proficiency tests are less demanding than they 
should be.” Id. at 565; see also United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 274 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(Michael, J., dissenting) (“Proficiency testing is typically based on a study of prints that 
are far superior to those usually retrieved from a crime scene.”); Jennifer L. Mnookin, 
Editorial, A Blow to the Credibility of Fingerprint Evidence, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 
2004, at A14 (“There are no systematic proficiency tests to evaluate examiners’ skill. 
Those tests that exist are not routinely used and are substandard.”).  
 30 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2004); Crisp, 
324 F.3d at 268; United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Ky. 2003). 
However, in State v. Rose, No. K06-545 (Md. Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 2007), a trial judge 
excluded fingerprint evidence. See James E. Starrs, Will Wonders Never Cease? 
Fingerprinting Denied its Day in Maryland Trial Court, 31 SCIENTIFIC SLEUTHING REV. 
1, 1 (2007) (discussing Rose).  
 31 E.g., Associated Press, Fingerprint Reliability Under Fire, S. FLA. SUN-
SENTINEL, Feb. 25, 2002, at A3; Joann Loviglio, Trial Judge Reaffirms Fingerprint 
Usability; Hearing Shows Him Science Involved, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. 
14, 2002, at A11; Andy Newman, Judge Who Ruled Out Matching Fingerprints 
Changes his Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at A27; Joseph A. Slobodzian, Court 
Ruling Blurs the Future for Fingerprint Experts: Linking of Print to Person Not 
Credible, Federal Judge Says, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 17, 2002, at A2; Richard 
Willing, Judge Challenges Fingerprint Identification, USA TODAY, Jan 10, 2002, at A3. 
 32 E.g., Michael Specter, Do Fingerprints Lie? The Gold Standard of Forensic 
Evidence is Now Being Challenged, 78 THE NEW YORKER 96 (May 27, 2002) (discussing 
case including interview with judge).  
 33 See David L. Faigman, Is Science Different for Lawyers?, 297 SCIENCE 339, 
339-40 (2002). 
 34 60 Minutes: Fingerprints (CBS television broadcast Jan. 5, 2003). 
 35 See Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility 
Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189 
(2004); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science” 
Is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2002); Nathan Benedict, Note, Fingerprints and the 
Daubert Standard for Admission of Scientific Evidence: Why Fingerprints Fail and a 
Proposed Remedy, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 519 (2004); Tara Marie La Morte, Comment, 
Sleeping Gatekeepers: United States v. Llera Plaza and the Unreliability of Forensic 
Fingerprinting Evidence Under Daubert, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 171 (2003); Kristin 
Romandetti, Note, Recognizing and Responding to a Problem with the Admissibility of 
Fingerprint Evidence Under Daubert, 45 JURIMETRICS 41 (2004); Jessica M. Sombat, 
Note, Latent Justice: Daubert’s Impact on the Evaluation of Fingerprint Identification 
Testimony, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2819 (2002). 
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with many commentators believing that Llera Plaza I was 
more faithful to Daubert than Llera Plaza II.36  
Once Daubert challenges on the admissibility of 
handwriting and fingerprint evidence had been filed, it was 
inevitable that firearms (ballistics) and tool mark 
identifications would also be questioned.37 Although the initial 
attacks failed,38 a pair of decisions by federal district courts in 
Boston changed all this. The first case, United States v. Green, 
was a frontal attack on the lack of empirical testing in this 
field. The expert testified that a match could be made “to the 
exclusion of every other firearm in the world.”39 That 
conclusion, according to Judge Gertner, was “extraordinary, 
particularly given [the expert’s] data and methods.”40 
Consequently, the expert would only be permitted to explain 
the ways in which the casings were similar, but not that they 
came from a specific weapon “to the exclusion of every other 
  
 36 E.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, 20 ISSUES IN 
SCI. & TECH. 47, 47 (2003) (“Judge Pollak’s first opinion [restricting latent fingerprint 
individualization testimony] was the better one.”); Sombat, supra note 35, at 2825 
(“[T]he result Judge Pollak reached when he excluded expert testimony concerning 
fingerprints [in Llera Plaza I] was fair.”); Recent Case, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2349, 2352 
(2002) (“Fingerprint expert testimony does not survive application of the Daubert 
factors . . . .”). 
 37 Firearms identification (“ballistics”) developed in the early part of the last 
century, and, by 1930, courts were admitting evidence based on the technique. 
Subsequent cases have followed these precedents, admitting evidence of bullet, 
cartridge case, and shot shell identifications. See 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra 
note 22, ch. 14 (discussing the scientific and legal issues associated with firearms and 
tool mark identifications).  
 38 See United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 526 (5th Cir. 2004) (ruling that 
“the matching of spent shell casings to the weapon that fired them has been a 
recognized method of ballistics testing in this circuit for decades”); United States v. 
Foster, 300 F. Supp. 2d 375, 376 n.1 (D. Md. 2004) (“Ballistics evidence has been 
accepted in criminal cases for many years. . . . In the years since Daubert, numerous 
cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification.”); United States v. 
Santiago, 199 F. Supp. 2d 101, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The Court has not found a single 
case in this Circuit that would suggest that the entire field of ballistics identification is 
unreliable.”); State v. Anderson, 624 S.E.2d 393, 398 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (no abuse of 
discretion in admitting bullet identification evidence); Commonwealth v. Whitacre, 878 
A.2d 96, 101 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to 
permit admission of the evidence regarding comparison of the two shell casings with 
the shotgun owned by Appellant”).  
 39 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005).  
 40 Id. Although the expert had seven years of experience in the field, he was 
not certified, and his lab was not accredited. Moreover, he had never been formally 
tested by a neutral proficiency examination. Finally, he could not cite any reliable error 
rates. The expert “conceded, over and over again, that he relied mainly on his 
subjective judgment. There were no reference materials of any specificity, no national 
or even local database on which he relied. And although he relied on his past 
experience with these weapons, he had no notes or pictures memorializing his past.” Id. 
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firearm in the world.”41 In the court’s view, that conclusion 
“stretche[d] well beyond [the expert’s] data and methodology.”42 
The court also issued a caution: “The more courts admit this 
type of toolmark evidence without requiring documentation, 
proficiency testing, or evidence of reliability, the more sloppy 
practices will endure; we should require more.”43 
The second case, United States v. Monteiro,44 resulted in 
a six-day evidentiary hearing. Although the court found that 
“the underlying scientific principle behind firearm 
identification—that firearms transfer unique toolmarks to 
spent cartridge cases—is valid under Daubert,”45 the expert in 
that case had yet to satisfy the other Daubert factors.46 
Moreover, the court described the traditional methodology as 
essentially “tautological,” entrusting the critical decision to 
“the minds eye of the examiner.”47  
The next year, in United States v. Williams,48 the Second 
Circuit upheld the admissibility of firearms identification 
evidence, while noting that it did “not wish this opinion to be 
taken as saying that any proffered ballistic expert should be 
routinely admitted.”49 Moreover, the court observed that the 
  
 41 Id. at 109. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id.  
 44 407 F. Supp. 2d 351 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 45 Id. at 355.  
 46 Because the expert did not make any sketches or take any photographs, 
adequate documentation was lacking: “Until the basis for the identification is described 
in such a way that the procedure performed by Sgt. Weddleton is reproducible and 
verifiable, it is inadmissible under Rule 702.” Id. at 374. Moreover, an independent 
second examiner had not confirmed the identification, which was particularly 
important because replacement parts had been used in the test-firing. Id. 
 47 The court wrote: 
[T]he AFTE Theory, upon which the government relies, is tautological: it 
requires each examiner to decide when there is “sufficient agreement” of 
toolmarks to constitute an “identification.” . . . This threshold is surpassed 
when the examiner finds that the agreement of toolmarks “exceeds the best 
agreement demonstrated between toolmarks known to have been produced by 
different tools and is consistent with agreement demonstrated by toolmarks 
known to have been produced by the same tool.” . . . Toolmark analysis does 
not follow an objective standard requiring, say, a certain percentage of marks 
to match.  
Id. at 370 (citations omitted) (citing Theory of Identification, Association of Firearm 
and Toolmark Examiners, 30 AFTE J. 86 (1998)). 
 48 506 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 49 Id. at 161; see also United States v. Natson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1261 
(M.D. Ga. 2007) (“According to his testimony, these toolmarks were sufficiently similar 
to allow him to identify Defendant’s gun as the gun that fired the cartridge found at 
the crime scene. He opined that he held this opinion to a 100% degree of certainty. . . . 
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Daubert trilogy did not “‘grandfather’ or protect from Daubert 
scrutiny evidence that had previously been admitted under 
Frye.”50 Some trial courts continued to limit the scope of the 
testimony, finding that the record did not support the 
conclusion that identifications can be made to the exclusion of 
all other firearms in the world.51 Another court ruled that the 
expert would be permitted to testify only that it was “more 
likely than not” that recovered bullets and cartridge cases came 
from a particular weapon.52 
Other techniques, such as bite mark comparison,53 
microscopic hair examination,54 bullet lead analysis,55 and 
intoxication testing,56 were also challenged. As Professor Berger 
had noted, the lack of empirical research was the critical issue. 
  
The Court also finds Tangren’s opinions reliable and based upon a scientifically valid 
methodology. Evidence was presented at the hearing that the toolmark testing 
methodology he employed has been tested, has been subjected to peer review, has an 
ascertainable error rate, and is generally accepted in the scientific community.”); 
Commonwealth v. Meeks, Nos. 2002-10961, 2003-10575, 2006 WL 2819423, at *50 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2006) (“The theory and process of firearms identification are 
generally accepted and reliable, and the process has been reliably applied in these 
cases. Accordingly, the firearms identification evidence, including opinions as to 
matches, may be presented to the juries for their consideration, but only if that 
evidence includes a detailed statement of the reasons for those opinions together with 
appropriate documentation.”). 
 50 506 F.3d at 162. 
 51 See United States v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp.2d 1170, 1180 (D.N.M. 2009); 
United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-00167, 2007 WL 485967, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 
2007).  
 52 United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see 
also United States v. Mouzone, Criminal No. WDQ-08-086, slip op. at 57 (D. Md. Oct. 
29, 2009) (magistrate recommendations). 
 53 See Paul C. Giannelli, Bite Mark Analysis, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 930, 932 
(2007) (discussing DNA exonerations in bitemark cases); Iain A. Pretty & David J. 
Sweet, The Scientific Basis for Human Bitemark Analyses—A Critical Review, 41 SCI. 
& JUST. 85, 86 (2001) (“Despite the continued acceptance of bitemark evidence in 
European, Oceanic and North American Courts the fundamental scientific basis for 
bitemark analysis has never been established.”). 
 54 See Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1554 (E.D. Okla. 1995), 
rev’d sub nom. on this issue, Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1523 (10th Cir. 1997). 
The district court had “been unsuccessful in its attempts to locate any indication that 
expert hair comparison testimony meets any of the requirements of Daubert.” Id. at 
1558. The court further observed: “Although the hair expert may have followed 
procedures accepted in the community of hair experts, the human hair comparison 
results in this case were, nonetheless, scientifically unreliable.” Id.  
 55 In 2003, a federal district court excluded bullet lead evidence under the 
Daubert standard, the first case to do so. United States v. Mikos, No. 02 CR 137, 2003 
WL 22922197, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2003); see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FORENSIC 
ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE 9 (2004) (identifying problems with 
bullet lead analysis).  
 56 See United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 549 (D. Md. 2002) (“Where, 
as here, that reliability has been challenged, the court cannot disregard the challenge, 
simply because a legion of earlier court decisions reached conclusions based on 
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B. Background Rates 
Professor Berger’s second point focused on the most 
significant (and fundamental) problem underlying forensic 
identification expert testimony—i.e., the inherent probabilistic 
quality of these opinions. She wrote:  
Prior to Daubert, courts admitted scientific evidence without noticing 
that, in some instances, the probative value of the evidence depends 
on background statistical information. If, for example, the samples of 
tape to which a defendant had access at his place of work match 
samples of tape used to manufacture a bomb sent through the mails 
from an unknown location, the probative value of that evidence is 
virtually non-existent if thousands of identical rolls of tape were 
distributed throughout the world. The crucial scientific inquiry in 
these cases is not only whether the technique is capable of producing 
matches, but also the probability that other matches exist. 
. . . We allow eyewitnesses to testify that the person fleeing the 
scene wore a yellow jacket and permit proof that a defendant owned 
a yellow jacket without establishing the background rate of yellow 
jackets in the community. Jurors understand, however, that others 
than the accused own yellow jackets. When experts testify about 
samples matching in every respect, the jurors may be oblivious to 
the probability concerns if no background rate is offered, or may be 
unduly prejudiced or confused if the probability of a match is 
confused with the probability of guilt, or if a background rate is 
offered that does not have an adequate scientific foundation.57  
In 2008, a year before the NAS Report on forensic 
science was issued, a different NAS Report, one on 
computerized ballistic imaging, echoed Professor Berger’s 
point. This Report cautioned: “Conclusions drawn in firearms 
identification should not be made to imply the presence of a 
firm statistical basis when none has been demonstrated.”58 In 
particular, the authors of the Report were concerned about 
testimony cast “in bold absolutes” such as an assertion that a 
match can be made to the exclusion of all other firearms in the 
world. “Such comments cloak an inherently subjective 
assessment of a match with an extreme probability statement 
  
reference to the same then-unchallenged authority. . . . I cannot agree that [various 
intoxication] tests, singly or in combination, have been shown to be as reliable as 
asserted by Dr. Burns, the NHTSA publications, and the publications of the 
communities of law enforcement officers and state prosecutors.”). 
 57 Procedural Paradigms, supra note 20, at 1356-57 (footnote omitted). 
 58 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, BALLISTIC IMAGING 82 (2008).  
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that has no firm grounding and unrealistically implies an error 
rate of zero.”59 
C. Error Rates 
Professor Berger’s third point concerned one of the 
Daubert Court’s reliability factors, i.e., error rates. She noted 
that “[p]re-Daubert courts often ignored laboratory and 
technician error rates resulting from the subjectivity involved 
in interpreting particular forensic tests and overlooked the lack 
of proper laboratory procedures that can produce other kinds of 
errors.”60 As it turned out, in many post-Daubert cases, 
fingerprint experts testified that the “error rate for the method 
is zero.”61 Experts argued that, while individual examiners may 
make mistakes, the method itself is perfect. However, in this 
context the dichotomy between “methodological” and “human” 
error rates is “practically meaningless”62 because the examiner 
is the method and the examiner’s judgment is subjective.63  
In sum, a year after Daubert was decided, Professor 
Berger predicted the nature of the challenges that would be 
mounted in the forensic identification cases, and more 
importantly, identified the critical issues—opinion testimony 
masking probabilistic assumptions and subjective judgments 
without acknowledging error rates.  
  
 59 Id. 
 60 Procedural Paradigms, supra note 20, at 1358.  
 61 United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000), aff’d, 
260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001). But see United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (“Testimony at the Daubert hearing indicated that some latent fingerprint 
examiners insist that there is no error rate associated with their activities or that the 
examination process is irreducibly subjective. This would be out-of-place under Rule 
702.”). 
 62 See Mnookin, supra note 28, at 60. She goes on to provide this analogy: 
“The same argument could be made of eyewitness testimony, a notoriously unreliable 
form of evidence. People are all distinct from one another in observable ways; therefore 
the theoretical error rate of eyewitness identification is zero, though in practice 
observers may frequently make errors.” Id.  
 63 See Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 143, 172 (2005) 
(“But, given its unavoidable subjective component, in latent print examination people 
are the process.”). In 2005, Professor Cole published an article documenting twenty-
three cases of fingerprint misidentifications. See Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: 
Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 985, 999 (2005). The misidentification cases include some that involved 
(1) verification by one or more other examiners; (2) examiners certified by the 
International Association of Identification; (3) procedures using a sixteen-point 
standard; and (4) defense experts who corroborated misidentifications made by 
prosecution experts. Id. at passim. 
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II. DNA EVIDENCE 
The advent of DNA profiling in 1985 produced a sea 
change in forensic science.64 One court called DNA evidence the 
“single greatest advance in the search for truth . . . since the 
advent of cross-examination.”65 Even its early critics 
acknowledged that “[a]ppropriately carried out and correctly 
interpreted, DNA typing is possibly the most powerful 
innovation in forensics since the development of fingerprinting 
in the last part of the 19th Century.”66 No other technique had 
been as complex or so subject to rapid change. New DNA 
technologies were introduced at the trial level as cases 
litigating the older procedures worked their way through the 
appellate court system.67  
Although the introduction of DNA evidence went 
smoothly in the early going, a significant challenge to 
admissibility was mounted in People v. Castro,68 a 1989 case. 
  
 64 In 1985, Dr. Alec Jeffreys of the University of Leicester, England, 
recognized the utility of DNA profiling in criminal cases. Its first use in American 
courts came the following year. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. 
CONGRESS, GENETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC USES OF DNA TESTS 8 (1990) [hereinafter 
OTA REPORT]. The first appellate case, Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1988) (holding DNA evidence admissible), rev. denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989), 
was reported in 1988. By January 1990, forensic DNA analysis had been admitted into 
evidence “in at least 185 cases by 38 States and the U.S. military.” OTA REPORT, 
supra, at 14. 
 65 People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988). The popular 
press trumpeted DNA evidence as “foolproof.” DNA Prints: A Foolproof Crime Test, 
TIME, Jan. 26, 1987, at 66; see also Arastasia Toufexis, Convicted by Their Genes: A 
New Forensic Test is Revolutionizing Criminal Prosecutions, TIME, Oct. 31, 1988, at 74.  
 66 Richard C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensic 
DNA Typing, 254 SCIENCE 1745, 1746 (1991).  
 67 The initial technique, Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) 
analysis by gel electrophoresis, was soon supplanted by Polymerase Chain Reaction 
(PCR)-based methods involving the DQ-alpha locus, “polymarkers,” and the D1S80 
locus. These, in turn, were replaced by Short Tandem Repeats, the current procedure. 
In addition to nuclear DNA analysis, courts have admitted evidence based on 
mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) sequencing, as well as DNA analyses of animals, plants, 
and the HIV virus. See United States v. Boswell, 270 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2001) (in a 
false statement prosecution, DNA used to compare swine blood); State v. Bogan, 905 
P.2d 515 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (in murder case, DNA of seed pods from palo verde trees 
at scene compared to those found in Bogan’s truck); State v. Schmidt, 699 So. 2d 448 
(La. Ct. App. 1997) (in a case of attempted murder by injection of HIV, expert testified 
that the strands of HIV from two persons were “closely related”). But see State v. 
Leuluaiaii, 77 P.3d 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (canine DNA match between sample 
obtained from defendant and murder victim’s dog not generally accepted). 
 68 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). In an unusual occurrence, the 
prosecution and defense experts met without the attorneys and issued a joint 
statement, including the following: “[T]he DNA data in this case are not scientifically 
reliable enough to support the assertion that the samples . . . do or do not match. If 
these data were submitted to a peer-reviewed journal in support of a conclusion, they 
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The initial DNA skirmishes were over laboratory protocols, as 
in Castro,69 but the controversy quickly metamorphosed into 
fights over statistical interpretation and population genetics. 
Population geneticists used statistical techniques to define the 
extent to which a match of DNA markers individuated the 
accused as the source of the crime scene sample and were able 
to point to extensive empirical testing to support their 
opinions.70 The validity of the statistical methods became the 
focus of litigation.71  
As the dispute heated, the FBI requested the National 
Academy of Sciences to review the procedure. That 
organization issued two reports on the subject, noting the 
importance of certain practices: “No laboratory should let its 
results with a new DNA typing method be used in court, unless 
it has undergone . . . proficiency testing via blind trials.”72 The 
first NAS Report on DNA, however, provoked its own 
controversy and a second report was requested.73 The 
controversy centered on a proposal (the ceiling principle) 
offered to resolve the statistical issues surrounding DNA 
testimony.74 Professor Berger served on the second NAS 
Committee, and its report settled many of the controverted 
issues—and, as she later noted, “DNA profiling . . . is 
undoubtedly our ‘gold standard’ of expertise.”75 
Professor Berger subsequently wrote on other DNA 
issues. One article addressed the reporting of laboratory error 
  
would not be accepted. Further experimentation would be required.” Eric S. Lander, 
DNA Fingerprinting On Trial, 339 NATURE 501, 504 (1989). See generally Jennifer L. 
Mnookin, People v. Castro: Challenging the Forensic Use of DNA Evidence, in 
EVIDENCE STORIES 207 (Richard Lempert ed., 2006). 
 69 See Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to 
Rest, 371 NATURE 735, 735 (1994) (“The initial outcry over DNA typing standards 
concerned laboratory problems: poorly defined rules for declaring a match; experiments 
without controls; contaminated probes and samples; and sloppy interpretation of 
autoradiograms. Although there is no evidence that these technical failings resulted in 
any wrongful convictions, the lack of standards seemed to be a recipe for trouble.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 70 See, e.g., id. at 736. 
 71 United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 208 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff’d sub nom., 
United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993).  
 72 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 55 (1992). 
 73 See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 
(1996).  
 74 See JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND CONTROVERSY 
IN THE MAKING OF DNA PROFILING 146 (2007). 
 75 Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings: Questions 
Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2003) (footnote omitted).  
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rates, an important but contentious issue.76 In another article, 
she examined the impact of DNA exonerations on the criminal 
justice system.77 In a book chapter, she considered DNA 
profiling’s impact on finality principles.78 
III. NAS FORENSIC SCIENCE REPORT 
As noted at the beginning of this essay, the National 
Academy of Sciences issued its landmark report on forensic 
science in the beginning of 2009.79 Implementation of its 
recommendations would be the most important development in 
forensic science since the establishment of the crime laboratory 
in the mid-1920s. The issues are pressing. As the Report 
recognized, “[a]mong existing forensic methods, only nuclear 
DNA analysis has been rigorously shown to have the capacity 
to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, 
demonstrate a connection between an evidentiary sample and a 
specific individual or source.”80 Professor Berger served on the 
Committee that wrote the report. 
The centerpiece of the report is a recommendation that 
Congress establish an independent federal entity, the National 
Institute of Forensic Sciences (NIFS), which would, among 
other things, fund research “to address issues of accuracy, 
reliability, and validity in the forensic science disciplines”81 and 
establish and enforce “best practices” for forensic science 
professionals and laboratories.82 Other recommendations 
include (1) mandating laboratory accreditation and practitioner 
certification,83 (2) removing crime laboratories from 
administrative control of law enforcement agencies and 
prosecutors’ offices,84 (3) supporting investigations into human 
  
 76 Margaret A. Berger, Laboratory Error Seen Through the Lens of Science 
and Policy, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081 (1997).  
 77 Margaret A. Berger, The Impact of DNA Exonerations on the Criminal 
Justice System, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 320, 321 (2006) (noting that “statutes governing 
post-conviction DNA procedures now exist in forty-one states, and bills are pending in 
others”). 
 78 Margaret A. Berger, Lessons from DNA: Restriking the Balance between 
Finality and Justice, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 109, 117 (David 
Lazer ed., 2004). 
 79 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009). 
 80 Id. at 100. 
 81 Id. at 22-23 (Recommendation 3.). 
 82 Id. at 19 (Recommendation 1(a).).  
 83 Id. (Recommendation 1(b).).  
 84 Id. at 24 (Recommendation 4.). 
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observer bias and sources of human error in forensic analysis,85 
and (4) developing standard terminology and model laboratory 
report formats.86 
According to the Report, NIFS should also draft a code 
of ethics for all forensic sciences and encourage individual 
forensic societies to incorporate this national code as part of 
their professional codes of conduct.87 In 1982, Professor Berger 
raised this issue at a conference on scientific evidence: “Is 
there, or should there be, a code of conduct for scientists that 
would provide a basis for objecting to testimony that strayed 
too far from strict impartiality?”88 At the same time, she 
commented that “[t]he inequality of available resources 
between the prosecution and the defense is alarming enough, 
but it is compounded by the lack of scientific literacy on the 
part of most defense lawyers.”89 Recommendation 10 of the NAS 
Report provides, in part: “NIFS should also support law school 
administrators and judicial education organizations in 
establishing continuing legal education programs [on forensic 
science] for law students, practitioners, and judges.”90 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Berger is one of the few scholars who is 
equally comfortable examining expert testimony issues in both 
civil and criminal cases.91 Her contribution to the development 
  
 85 Id. (Recommendation 5.).  
 86 Id. at 22 (Recommendation 2.). 
 87 Id. at 2 (Recommendation 9.). Moreover, the Report recommended the 
creation of an enforcement mechanism for ethical violations through the certification 
process. 
 88 Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187, 228 
(1984). 
 89 Id. at 233. 
 90 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 79, at 27-28 (Recommendation 10.). 
 91 See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse 
Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort 
Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290 (2001) (“The Federal Judicial Center 
conducted surveys in 1991 and 1998 asking federal judges and attorneys about expert 
testimony. In the 1991 survey, seventy-five percent of the judges reported admitting all 
proffered expert testimony. By 1998, only fifty-nine percent indicated that they 
admitted all proffered expert testimony without limitation. Furthermore, sixty-five 
percent of plaintiff and defendant counsel stated that judges are less likely to admit 
some types of expert testimony since Daubert.”); Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating 
General Causation: Notes Towards A New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2135 (1997) (“All [the studies on specific toxic torts] report that 
the corporation in question did not test its product adequately initially, failed to impart 
information when potential problems emerged, and did not undertake further research 
in response to adverse information. It appears that the corporations took virtually no 
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of the law and society, through her scholarship and public 
service on various NAS committees, has been exemplary. It is 
only fitting that this essay should conclude with her words:  
What criminal defendants need in order to deal more effectively with 
the forensic identification expertise proffered against them is not 
more Daubert, but tools that would enable them to make more 
cogent evidentiary arguments—better counsel, access to expert 
assistance and more discovery.92 
  
steps to determine or minimize the possibility of harm until their hands were forced, 
usually by litigation.”). 
 92 Berger, supra note 75, at 1140. She also wrote: 
I strongly believe that we need a very stringent standard of proof in criminal 
cases. I do not think, however, that Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. has been productive in effectuating this goal. In civil cases, courts engage 
in rigorous gatekeeping and often exclude plaintiffs’ experts because the 
theory underlying their testimony has not been adequately validated. But I 
see no sign of a parallel approach in criminal cases even when there are 
problems with the assumptions on which the prosecution’s expert testimony 
rests. 
Id. at 1125.  
